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This paper examines the degree to which the learning by doing externality [LBD] calls for an undervalued
exchange rate, a policy suggested by recent empirical studies which concluded that mildly undervalued
real exchange rate may enhance growth. We obtain mixed results. For an economy where LBD externality
operates in the traded sector, real exchange rate undervaluation may be used in order to internalize
this externality, if the LBD calls for subsidizing employment in the traded sector. Yet, we also find
that these results are not robust to changes in the nature of the LBD externality. If the LBD externality
is embodied in aggregate investment, the optimal policy calls for subsidizing the cost of capital in
the traded sector, and there is no room for undervalued exchange rate policy. In addition, a deliberate
undervaluation by means of hoarding reserves may backfire if the needed sterilization would increase
the cost of investment in the traded sector.
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  The remarkable takeoff in the hoarding of international reserves by developing 
countries has been the focus of growing attention and controversies.  A casual inspection 
of the International reserves/GDP ratio trends depicted in Figure 1, and the pattern of 
hoarding reserves by China in Figure 2, reveals that the hoarding trend from 2001 has 
been driven mostly by China.  Chinese international reserves were stable in the aftermath 
of the East Asian 1997-8 crisis, but took off at an accelerated speed after 2001, more than 
quadrupled in five years [2001-2006], reaching by now about 1500 billion dollar.  Within 
this time frame, Chinese international reserves/GDP almost tripled from a relatively high 
initial level of 15%.  Noting the decline in the growth rate of China in the late 1990s, 
followed by a substantially higher growth rate in the 2000s, some observers attribute the 
accelerated hoarding of reserves after 2001 to an export led growth policy supported by 
mercantilist hoarding of reserves.  According to this view, hoarding reserves encourages 
exports by mitigating or preventing the real exchange rate appreciation that would have 
occurred under a fully flexible exchange rate system.  Indeed, hoarding international 
reserves has been advocated by Dooley et al. (2004) as a key ingredient of the export-led 
growth strategy of China.  Yet, Aizenman and Lee (2006) noted that such a policy may 
also reflect competitive hoarding among emerging markets, attempting to preserve their 
market share in the US and other OECD countries.  Modeling this situation in a version 
of Johnson’s tariff game suggests that a country with the lowest cost of sterilization 
(arguably China), may be the winner of such a game, resulting with “beggar thy 
neighbor” outcome.   The losers on such a game [arguably Korea, Japan, etc.] would keep 
hoarding reserves to minimize their losses, and will invest directly in China to mitigate 
their competitive losses.  These results are consistent with Figure 3, indicating the 
acceleration of FDI from Japan and Korea to China from 2001, coinciding with the 
takeoff of Chinese hoarding of international reserves. 
  Econometric support for the negative effects of overvaluation on growth have 
been found by Dollar (1992), Razin and Collins (1999) and others.  More recently, 
Aguirre and Calderón (2005) found that RER misalignments hinder growth but the effect 
is non-linear: growth declines are larger, the larger the size of the misalignments. 
Although large undervaluations hurt growth, small to moderate undervaluations enhance 
growth. [See also Johnson and others (2007).] Overviewing this literature, Prasad et al.   3
(2007) point out that overvaluation is frequently the outcome of real factors, like 
demographic aspects determining the supply of labor, the domestic supply of capital and 
the inflow of foreign capital, fiscal policy, etc.  
  A drawback of the above literature is that it presumed that export led growth 
strategy requires a policy of undervalued exchange rate, without explaining the potential 
market failure that is addressed by undervaluation or the hoarding of international 
reserves.  This issue is of obvious relevance for understanding East Asia – Aizenman and 
Lee (2006) pointed out that mercantilist hoarding of reserves is a relatively new 
phenomenon in East Asia, and that, during the fast growth phases, Japan (prior to 1992) 
and Korea (prior to 1997) refrained from an aggressive hoarding of reserves.  Instead, 
Japan and Korea frequently encouraged export-led growth by subsidizing selectively the 
cost of capital in outward oriented activities, at a cost of reducing the quality of banks’ 
balance sheet.  Consequently, there may be various ways of achieving the objective of 
export-led growth, and one needs to understand the conditions underpinning the desire to 
subsidize export led growth in order to better understand the policy choices confronting 
East Asian countries.  While the presumption of Dooley et al. (2005) has been that 
hoarding international reserves by China is a win-win strategy, our approach is more 
agnostic, viewing it as the outcome of non cooperative interaction among countries, 
where some may be adversely affected.   
  The purpose of the present paper is to model the circumstances that would lead to 
the export led growth drive, and to study the challenges associated with implementing 
such a policy. We model an economy populated by agents consuming non traded and 
traded goods. The non traded is the “traditional” good, produced only by labor, whereas 
the traded, dubbed manufacturing, is produced by labor and capital, also being subject to 
the learning by doing [dubbed LBD] externality.  Specifically, the productivity of the 
atomistic firm in the traded sector is determined by the “stock” of experience gained from 
past aggregate production of the traded good.
1  We focus on the implications of the LBD 
                                                 
1 See Krugman (1987), Young (1991), Ambler, Cardia and Farazli (1999) and Leahy and Neary (1999) for 
earlier studies dealing with the impact of policies in the presence of learning by doing. 
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externality on the conduct of policies, and the robustness of the results to the nature of the 
LBD externality.     
 
1. Basic  Model: 
We consider a real model, where the periodic utility is 
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where  N C  and  X C  are the consumption of the non traded and the traded goods at time t.  
The subjective discount factor is β.  The traded sector, dubbed manufacturing, is 
produced by a large number of competitive firms, q, and is subject to the learning by 
doing externality.  Aggregate manufacturing output is  
 
(2)  () ( )
1
,, , tt r x t r t Xq A L K
α α −
=  ;  
 
where index r refers to the reprehensive firm in manufacturing, employing  ,, rxt L , , rt K  
labor and capital at time t, respectively.  To simplify exposition, we assume that capital is 
subject to full depreciation within a period, and that the traded good invested at time t 
provides the stock of capital stock at time t+1.   The non traded good is the tradition 
sector, produced using a Ricardian technology  ., . nt rxt LL q L =−   , where the aggregate 
supply of labor is L . 
The productivity index A is affected by learning by doing: today’s aggregate 
production increases future productivity by the experience and the know-how learned 
today.  We assume that this effect is subject to depreciation overtime.  Specifically, we 
assume that A  increases with the lagged aggregate discounted output: 
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and 01 δ <≤  is the depreciation rate of the LBD stock,  t Ω .   The number of firms, q, is 
large enough such that the learning by doing is external to each firm.     5
The main effects of the LBD externality are illustrated clearly in a two period 
example (t = 1, 2), where the stock of capital in period 1 is given by history, and 
productivity is normalized to   ( ) 12 1 1; 1 AA X
ε
== + .  Consider the planner’s problem for 
the case where the investment is self financed, i.e. where we assume first a balanced 
current account. Since the consumption and the production are identical for both traded 
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From which we infer that  
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The following table summarizes a simulation, tracing the optimal employment for the 
case where 1 6, 10, 0.4, 0.02, 0.7, 0.05 Lq K γ βα == = = = =. 
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, ,1 , ,2 ,2 ,1 ,1 ,1 ;; ; / rx rx r n n x LLK p P P =  
ε = 0    0.35   0.31      0.05         0.34 
 
ε = 0.2   0.38   0.31      0.065       0.316   
 
ε = 0.4   0.415   0.31      0.082       0.29   
 
Table 1 
LBD externality and optimal employment and investment, a two period example   
 
The LBD externality increases the total marginal product of labor, increasing thereby the 
optimal first period employment.  The resultant higher second period productivity 
increases the optimal capital.  As the second period is the end of the planning horizon, the 
LBD externality is not impacting the second period employment patterns.  This is an 
artifact of the two-period horizon, and will be shown not to hold if one extends the 
model’s horizon. 
Despite its effects on the level of employment and production, however, the LBD 
externality has no direct effect on the socially optimal level of trade surplus.  Trade 
imbalance, or foreign lending and borrowing, can be introduced by variable  t F  which 
denotes the stock of net foreign assets at the beginning (end) of period t (t-1).  
 
*
1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) tt t X t N t t N t t Fr F X C P N C I + =+ + − + − − 
where  t I  is the investment. In the two-period case, the net foreign assets at the end of 
period 2 would be optimally zero, and we assume the initial net foreign assets (at the 
beginning of period 1) to be zero. We can then write consumer’s problem as follows.  
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We can see that the LBD externality has no effect of increasing trade surplus. The 












This is the condition that is familiar from the standard intertemporal model of current 
account, according to which an economy borrows or lends to equate the intertemporal 
rate of substitution to the international rate of interest.   
The strength of LBD externality thus has no direct effect on the level of trade 
surplus or deficit, and has an indirect effect by changing the incentive for intertemporal 
trade. The effect can be in the direction that a strong LBD externality would increase the 
incentive to borrow in the earlier period before the LBD externality has not materialized 
in the form of a high productivity. A strong LBD externality implies that, ceteris paribus, 
the output in later periods are higher because of a higher productivity. The economy in 
the initial periods is therefore looking forward to later periods of higher output, and thus 
would like to borrow to fund a higher consumption. 
  In the rest of the paper, we flash out the policy implications of the LBD 
externality on the basis of the balanced-trade assumption. We have seen that a strong 
LBD externality does not sway one way or the other, the trade surplus in the early phase 
of economic growth. This implication is broadly consistent with the growth experience of 
Japan and Korea, neither of which had particularly large current account or trade 
surpluses during their early years of economic growth (except in years of macroeconomic 
crises). In both countries, massive reserve accumulation had come around in later stages 
of growth, following crisis-driven economic slowdown [Aizenman and Lee (2006)].  
 
2. Policy  Implications: 
To explore the implication of the LBD externality on the real exchange rate, we write the 





































where  ,1 n p is the real exchange rate, defined by the relative price of non traded to traded 
goods [hence, our numeraire is the traded good].  Applying (7) to (5a), and the 
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The FOC condition for the socially optimal first period employment equates the value of 
the marginal produce of labor in the non traded sector [= the real exchange rate] with the 
value of the social marginal product of labor in the traded sector [the RHS of (8a)].  The 
employment under a competitive equilibrium corresponds to a similar FOC, where the 
learning by doing externality is ignored (corresponding to ε = 0).  Hence, optimality calls 
for subsidizing employment in the traded sector, and is consistent with an undervalued 
real exchange rate.  The subsidy internalizes LBD externality, and applies as long as the 
learning by doing is external to the firm.   
In a short digression, note that if there were uncertainty about the degree to which 
the authorities would adopt the policies called by the LBD externalities, the early 
investors would enjoy a windfall gains following the adaptation of these policies.  This 
follows from the observation that gross rent per unit of capital in the first period increases 
with the labor/capital ratio [note that 
1
1, 1 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 (1 )( ) ( ) / (1 )( / ) rx r rx r KL K L K
α αα αα
− −= −  ].  
Hence, a policy that would reduce the cost of labor in period one would increase the rent 
of installed capital -- the prospect of adopting the policy that would internalize the   9
externality in period 1 has the effect of increasing the rent to the capital invested in period 
zero,  1 K .  Our discussion can be extended to the case where capital depreciates overtime.  
In these circumstances, anticipation of the gains associated with adopting future polices 
that would internalize the LBD externality may induce potentially large inflows of FDI at 
early stages of the development process, even if the present fundamentals are mixed.   
The above example provides a strong case for real exchange undervaluation.  Yet, 
this result hinges on the nature of the LBD externality.  To gain further insight, we review 
now several extensions dealing with the planning horizon and the nature of the LBD 
externality.   
We first extend the model to a three period horizon, focusing on the planner’s 
problem in period one, setting the investment determining the stock of capital in period 
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The firm’s FOC is a special case of (10’), where ε = 0.  Hence, optimality calls for 
subsidizing both employment and investment in the traded sector, at a rate that increases 
with the LBD externality.  Note that extending the planning horizon implies that, with the 
exception of the terminal employment and capital levels, the LBD externality increases 
the social marginal product of both labor and capital due to the impact of the present 
output on future productivity.   
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Similar FOC applies: the social marginal product of each input is inclusive of the NPV of 
















































Note that the LBD externality calls for subsidizing the inputs used in the production of 
manufacturing, at a rate that increases with the externality, as is reflected by ε.  The 
magnitude of the subsidy to labor and capital differs due to timing issues, as the capital 
used at time t was invested at t – 1, whereas labor used in time t is hired in the spot 
market.  The gap between the optimal subsidy to labor and capital depend negatively on 
the LBD deprecation rate, δ, and the discount factor, β.  In the limiting case, where 
0& 0 β δ →→  , the two subsidies rates are identical.    11
In assessing these results, one should keep in mind the dependence of the optimal 
policy on the nature of the LBD externality.  Suppose that the externality is embodied in 
the capital, as has been modeled frequently by the endogenous growth literature that 
followed Romer (1986).
2  This would be the case when knowledge creation is a side 
product of investment, as is when productivity at time t increases with aggregate capital. 
In terms of our model, the LBD stock at time t would be: 
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where  ,1 ii q ≤≤ is the index of firms.  In these circumstances, optimal policy calls for 
subsidizing only the cost of capital, and that real exchange rate undervaluation would not 
deal with this type of LBD externality.
3  In contrast, if the LBD externality is embodied 
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for real exchange rate undervaluation instead of subsidizing capital. The endogenous 
growth literature frequently assumed that the LBD externality is embodied in aggregate 
investment, apparently due to the more convenient modeling associated with it.  Yet, 
there is no clear empirical evidence that provides support the “aggregate investment” 
externality instead of an “aggregate production” or “aggregate employment” externalities.   
  We add now rudimentary monetary considerations.  Suppose that we start with a 
configuration of a fixed exchange rate, where the nominal exchange rate is pegged to 1, 
and the law of one price under which the foreign currency price of the traded good is 
normalized at 1. We assume that individuals choose to hold domestic currency so as to 
economize on the transactions costs of exchange associated with producing the GDP, 
leading to a demand for money  
                                                 
2 This literature frequently assumed that productivity increases with the aggregate capital stock, 
, () ti t
i
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3 This follows form the observation that when the LBD externality is given by (3’); the FOC for the optimal 
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Let the initial supply of money 
s
t M  be set to accommodate a given path of production 
and expenditure, assuring zero balance of payment.   
  Suppose that a shock induces monetary expansion of (1 ) t sF − , where  t F is the 
original shock [reflecting inflow of capital, favorable trade shock; etc.], and s is the 
coefficient of sterilization. Hence, the new short run equilibrium at time t is: 
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A monetary disturbance  t F  induces the real appreciation at a rate that depends inversely 
on the openness of the economy, as measured by the GDP share of the traded sector.  
Similarly, sterilization mitigates the real appreciation at a rate that depends inversely on 
the openness of the economy.  This in turn suggests that keeping the real exchange rate at 
a level that internalizes the LBD externality calls for the sterilization of financial inflows.   
  The sterilization has to be of a real variety, which can keep the real exchange rate 
at the optimal level and maintain the nominal exchange rate at its peg (assumed to equal 1 
in equation (14)). The combination of BOP inflows and offsetting stabilizations can result 
in the pattern that was or has been observed in several emerging markets. In an effort to 
sterilize the effect of large BOP inflows—via current or financial account—the 
                                                 
4 Note that the envelope theorem implies that ,, [] / 0 nt t t xt dp N X d L + = , hence we ignore second order 
GDP effects associated with employment changes induced by the real appreciation.    13
government accumulates large external assets in the form of international reserves. While 
this sterilization by pumping out BOP inflows continues, the real exchange rate can be 
maintained at a level that stimulates production and consequent improvement in 
productivity via the LBD channel.    
 
3. Discussion   
Our analysis suggests circumstances under which policies promoting sectors 
characterized by the LBD externality may be desirable.  Yet, the details of these policies 
hinge on the exact nature of this externality, and the quality of the governance which 
ultimately determines the efficacy of policy intervention.  It would be too simplistic to 
view the successful growth of China as stemming from any deliberate undervalued 
exchange rate by means of large reserves hoardings.   First, similar success stories in East 
Asia have happened without active hoarding policies.  Second, depending on the nature 
of the LBD externality, it may call for subsidizing the cost of capital, subsidizing the cost 
of labor, or both.  Real exchange rate undervaluation would be the suggested policy only 
if the LBD externality calls for subsidizing employment in the traded sector, and if this 
end can’t be accomplished by more effective means.  After all, hoarding international 
reserves is a policy that impacts the stance of monetary policy and the domestic interest 
rates.  Such a policy may backfire if the needed sterilization would lead to markedly 
higher interest rate, reducing thereby capital accumulation in the traded sector. The 
adverse financing effects of hoarding reserves are more likely to be larger in countries 
characterized with shallow financial system, low saving rates, and more costly 
sterilization; conditions that on balance apply to LATAM.  Finally, the adaptation of 
similar hoarding policies by countries competing in the same third market may lead to 
competitive hoarding, dissipating the competitive gains of most involved countries [see 
Aizenman and Lee (2006)].  Yet, hoarding reserves may be an effective short-
intermediate run policy dealing with balance of payment effects of shocks whose 
permanency is not known, like TOT improvements and capital inflows [see Aizenman 
and Riera-Crichton (2006)].     14
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